Enron and WorldCom are the most prominent examples, to continued and widespread deficiencies in corporate governance-from defectively structured boards of directors and conflicted auditors to inadequate internal controls." As Jack Coffee explains: "In the [2001] [2002] crisis that led up to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers at literally hundreds of companies inflated earnings, typically by prematurely recognizing income, which behavior resulted in the number of annual financial statement restatements growing hyperbolically over the period from 1996 to 2002."" In an effort to redress these deficiencies, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the most compre-
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hensive federal regulation of corporate governance ever.
Although many commentators criticized Sarbanes-Oxley as a legislative overreaction," agency costs, conflicts of interest, and fundamental failures in corporate decisionmaking persisted. Many of these failures have come to light since 2008, as the widespread effect of the credit crisis has unearthed problems ranging from egregious errors in risk management at AIG" and Bear Stearns 9 to the decision by auto industry executives who, unable to maintain their businesses as solvent entities, flew to Washington in their private jets to beg for a government bailout." These failures will, in turn, spawn a new wave of corporate governance reforms. It has been less than two years since the United States Treasury Department proposed its blueprint for financial regulation," which was premised largely upon the relaxing of regulatory standards in order to increase the global competitiveness of US businesses. Now, instead, businesses face the potential for still more extensive regulatory intervention. Congress and regulators are already taking steps to monitor issuer transactions involving risky financial products," to control the level and structure of executive compensation, and to increase shareholder input into the selection of corporate directors.
In light of these new reform efforts, it has become vitally important to understand US corporate governance better-the existing mechanisms and how they work, the regulatory and structural attributes that limit their potential effectiveness, and the extent to which corporate governance failures contributed to the most recent economic crisis. Toward . Macey persuasively explains how easy it is for regulators to get it wrong and demonstrates how even well-intended regulations can have perverse effects. Political pressure and interest group forces are likely to render regulation even less effective.
At the same time, Macey's project does not go far enough. Although Macey is correct in championing market discipline over regulatory solutions, the history of US business suggests that market incentives alone may be insufficient to constrain-and may even exacerbate-some forms of managerial wrongdoing, including fraud, selfdealing, and excessive risk-taking. Going forward, the challenge for regulatory reform is to address and improve the effectiveness of capital market discipline.
Part I of this Review considers several of the governance mechanisms most heavily criticized by Macey-boards of directors, shareholder voting, and litigation. Part II examines Macey's preferred "market-based" alternatives-the takeover market, the initial public offering, and hedge funds. In Part III, this Review considers the effect of the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 on Macey's analysis. While the crisis offers compelling evidence of the failure of several traditional governance mechanisms, it also highlights weaknesses in the capacity of the markets to provide effective discipline. This Review identifies several reasons for these weaknesses and argues that addressing these reasons should be the focus of regulatory reform efforts.
I. MACEY'S THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The core thesis of Promises Kept is that regulatory interventions have interfered with corporate governance-limiting those mechanisms that are most effective and encouraging those that are least effective. The thesis is summarized in a chart in which Macey details thirteen corporate governance mechanisms and classifies them according to whether they are (1) effective and (2) regulatorily encouraged (p 50). The two right hand columns highlight Macey's conclusion: there is no overlap between column one-those mechanisms that are effective-and col- umn two -those that are encouraged. Regulators, in Macey's view, have consistently gotten corporate governance wrong.
Macey goes on to examine the various governance mechanisms in detail, devoting, in most cases, a separate chapter to each. His methodology, which draws on a mixture of theoretical analysis, academic literature, and case study illustrations (but not extensively on empirical analysis2), explains the operation of each governance device and the extent to which its role has been the subject of regulatory encouragement or limitations.
The governance institution that receives Macey's most extensive attack is the board of directors (pp 51-89). Macey correctly observes that corporate governance scholarship has focused considerable attention on the composition, quality, and particularly the independence of the board of directors. As Macey explains, "The board of directors is at the epicenter of U.S. corporate governance" (p 51).
Macey argues forcefully that this reliance is misplaced. Corporate boards are, he claims, subject to capture as a result of management ties, cognitive biases, and social norms that undermine directors' ability to exercise independent judgment. Directors are, for example, bound by norms of collegiality that make it difficult to question management (p 61). Directors' access to corporate information is generally subject to management control (p 60).2 Directors and senior executives operate at close proximity, through a web of professional and social ties (p 57). As a result of these forces, boards are unlikely to serve as effective monitors (p 57)."
At the same time, the increased importance of board monitoring impedes the directors' ability to serve as strategic advisors. Macey describes the "dual role" of boards as both monitors and advisors and explains that these roles are internally inconsistent (pp 53-54). Board involvement in a managerial function limits the board's capacity to serve as a monitor. As Macey puts it, the directors face an inherent conflict when they are called upon to evaluate decisions in which they previously participated (p 54). In addition, board participation in strategic planning strengthens the board's commitment and ties to the current management team, increasing the likelihood of board capture (p 63).
Although Macey is not the first scholar to recognize the inherent tension between the board's monitoring and managing functions, 3 2 he is clearly correct in his claim that the two functions are largely irreconcilable. That battle, however, has long been lost. Corporations largely have sacrificed the potential value of managing boards in favor of the independent monitoring board. What is less clear, however, is that the monitoring board has been a failure on its own terms.
Concededly, monitoring boards do not offer corporations strategic advice, operational analysis, or other types of managerial support. As a result, large-scale empirical studies are unlikely to find a link between board monitoring and firm performance. M Rather, monitoring boards are likely to provide the most value in deterring managerial self-dealing and responding to crises. Assessing the deterrent value of board monitoring requires an impossible counterfactual analysis-would management have engaged in misconduct but for the monitoring?
3 ' Assessing the value of the board in crisis management presents similar challenges. Corporations for which crisis management is important are a subset of all corporations. Within this subset, the absence of a benchmark makes it difficult to know if the board's actions were appropriate-did the board respond soon enough, and were the steps it took effective? 32 Indeed, I made this point myself more than a decade ago. See Jill E. Fisch More significantly, as Jeff Gordon suggests, the evolution of the monitoring board appears to be more a product of market forces than regulatory intervention.M To be sure, the Delaware courts have encouraged the use of independent directors in the context of specific decisions, such as evaluating tender offers or responding to derivative litigation," but these decisions neither require a majority independent board nor limit the board's role to monitoring. Sarbanes-Oxley and the self-regulating organization (SRO) rules mandate increased board independence,2 but these requirements are of relatively recent origin and largely reflect preexisting corporate norms. Indeed, probably the most substantial factor in the move to independent monitoring boards has been the market pressure imposed by institutional investors."
Whether those pressures were misguided remains an open question." Several empirical studies have shown that independent boards function more effectively in specific situations. . James Cotter, Anil Shiv-
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See Gordon, 59 Stan L Rev at 1477-99 (cited in note 33) (describing various factors contributing to increased board independence). Alternatively, one could view the monitoring board as a low cost accommodation to the political pressure imposed by state pension funds-a perspective that is consistent with some of Macey's observations in other parts of the book about the role of political forces (pp 33,45,126). 37 See, for example, In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A2d 917, 942-46 (Del Ch 2003) (rejecting the dismissal recommendation of a special litigation committee based on lack of evidence that committee members were sufficiently independent); Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A2d 946, 954-55 (Del 1985) (holding that the existence of a majority of independent directors on the board "materially enhance[s]" the proof needed to satisfy the burden of "good faith and reasonable investigation" upon judicial review of a board's rejection of a tender offer).
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See 15 USC § 78j-1(m)(3) (mandating that "[e]ach member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent"); [and] the need for independent non-executive directors"). 4o See, for example, Bhagat and Black, 27 J Corp L at 257 (cited in note 34) (describing evidence on value of independent boards as "equivocal"). 41 In that vein, Macey's evidence of board failure appears to be anecdotal. Even accepting that the case studies discussed in Chapter 5 are evidence of board capture, they represent four of the thousands of publicly traded companies in the United States. See, for example, NYSE Euronext: Listings, online at http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1170350259411.html (visited Sept 15, dasani, and Marc Zenner find that independent boards enhance target shareholder gains from takeovers.4 Michael Weisbach shows that independent boards are more likely to respond to poor performance by replacing the CEO." John Byrd and Kent Hickman report that firms with a majority of outside directors make better acquisitions." More recent analysis suggests that the regulatory mandates for independence may themselves provide independent value. For example, Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein find that the imposition of SRO board independence rules upon companies reduced CEO compensation."
More generally, increased board independence may have been a factor in modernizing corporations away from the overdiversified and inefficient conglomerates of the 1970s. One contributing factor is the ability of outside directors to respond to the information provided by the capital markets through stock prices. As Jeff Gordon observes, "the increasing informativeness and value of stock market signals" gave the outside directors an easy tool to use in their effort to enhance shareholder value." Transparent and efficient stock prices enable directors to use "stock price maximization as the measure of managerial success." This in turn simplifies the board's role as monitor."
Relying on stock price as the metric for evaluating governance complicates Macey's case analysis, however. Specifically, although Macey describes TransUnion and Disney as involving "monumentally bad decision-making" and providing evidence of board capture, both cases, as Macey concedes, involved substantial shareholder gains (p 69). In TransUnion, the board approved a merger that provided a substantial 2009) (stating that the NYSE Euronext alone has approximately 8,500 listed companies). A corporate governance mechanism with that sort of failure rate would appear to be an unparalleled success. premium for stockholders-41 percent more than the highest price at which the stock had traded in the previous five years (p 73). In Disney, the market value of Disney's stock increased by more than $1 billion in a single day in response to the announcement that Michael Ovitz had been hired (p 78).4' Moreover, if informed stock prices enhance market discipline, perhaps board effectiveness should be understood in terms of price quality, not absolute price. The monitoring board focuses the role of independent directors on assuring the reliability of firm financial disclosure.5 Evolving governance norms and regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley both address financial transparency and prescribe specific requirements for the board generally, and the audit committee in particular, designed to increase information flow and reduce capture of the independent directors." These reforms appear consistent with Macey's conception of effective governance.
Macey's second major target is shareholder voting (pp 199-222). Macey summarizes the traditional theoretical arguments against greater shareholder voice -shareholders suffer from collective action problems, lack sufficient stakes to research election issues adequately, and engage in rational apathy (pp 202-04). He also challenges Lucian Bebchuk's claim that meaningful democratic voice is necessary to con-
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Concededly the terms of Ovitz's employment contract-specifically the amount of his severance package-were not part of the public announcement.
So Elsewhere, Macey rejects the effectiveness of accounting firms, arguing that they suffer from cartelization and capture (pp 155-64). The failure of accounting firms might as easily be attributed to insufficient regulation. Although the SEC has authority to regulate both accounting and auditing directly, historically it has delegated this responsibility to the industry. See George J. Macey also describes voting as favored by regulation, a description that is in tension with the many regulatory limitations on shareholder voting power. The SEC, for example, has limited the ability of shareholders to overcome collective action problems by mandating extensive disclosure in connection with the solicitation of proxies. Through its shareholder proposal rule, the SEC has interposed its staff as the primary determinant of what constitutes a proper subject for the exercise of shareholder voting power. In 2007, the SEC amended its rules to overturn the effect of a federal court decision permitting shareholders to modify the director nomination process through direct nomination bylaws," although the new Democrat-controlled SEC recently proposed a rule that would provide shareholders with proxy access under specified circumstances. 8 Other 53 Macey states that "poison pills should not be adopted unless shareholders are allowed to vote on them first" (p 205).
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More precisely, the capital markets impose a discount on nonvoting shares. plurality voting." Under plurality voting, shareholder efforts to oppose management-nominated directors outside the mechanism of a proxy contest are ineffective-by definition shareholders cannot defeat a management candidate without nominating an alternative candidate.6
The ability of incumbent management to use corporate resources, virtually without limit, to solicit proxies also creates a substantial funding imbalance that deters election contests and other challenges. Until recently, even the rules of the SROs reduced the effectiveness of the shareholder vote by granting brokers the discretion to vote custodial shares for which they lacked explicit voting instructions-shares that historically were voted in favor of management.62 Because of these restrictions, shareholder voting has traditionally been relatively ineffective, as Macey argues (pp 199-200). Arguably, however, shareholder voting offers the potential to serve as a mediated market constraint on managerial power, mediated in the sense that it enables shareholders collectively to exercise control in a more moderated fashion than by selling their stock, either to a hostile bidder or into the open market. For shareholders who believe a corporation's strategic direction is misguided, a shift in board representation may carry that message.' For shareholders who believe management is overly entrenched, governance changes, such as increasing shareholder nomination power or dismantling takeover defenses, may be appropriate.
Indeed, Macey's discussion of dissident directors illustrates the potential power of shareholder voting. As Macey explains, hedge funds and other activist shareholders have begun to nominate short slates of director candidates for the purpose of changing the dynamic of the boards of underperforming companies (p 90). In most cases, the dissident slate is nominated on the platform of an identified strategic or structural change for the issuer-a financial restructuring, costcutting, or a proposed sale of the company." By electing the dissident slate, shareholders are, in effect, voting their support for the activist's platform. Although the empirical analysis of this activism has, to date, been limited, early studies suggest that such activism may increase firm value. Moreover, improving corporate governance through proxy contests is far less costly than a hostile takeover, making it potentially viable at large public companies.
Concededly, the case for shareholder voting has not yet been made. Institutional investors may have conflicts of interest or agendas that render increased shareholder power problematic, as Macey illustrates with his example of empty voting (pp 214-19)." Other commentators have raised similar concerns about the incentives of hedge funds," public pension funds," and union funds." At the end of the day, however, Macey's own analysis suggests that shareholder voting offers
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This message is the impetus for Joseph Grundfest's proposed "just vote no" campaigns. considerable potential for inducing management to keep its promises to shareholders. Reducing current regulatory restrictions may increase that potential.
Macey also considers shareholder litigation (pp 130-54). He states that, according to conventional wisdom, shareholder litigation is second only to corporate boards in importance as a corporate governance mechanism (p 130). Macey believes that this conventional wisdom is simply "wrong" (p 130). In support, Macey describes a litigation system that is badly broken, one in which large amounts of money are transferred between investors with little overall benefit."o He further explains that the system is plagued by agency costs that leave plaintiffs' lawyers in control of the system and create substantial incentives for abuse. The result, in his words, is a "litigation crisis" that increases the cost of capital (p 153).
Criticisms of shareholder litigation for its excessive agency costs are widespread." In his own prior work, Macey proposed an innovative mechanism for reducing these costs by auctioning off shareholders' claims.7 Regulators have devoted extensive attention, however, to reducing agency costs through procedural restrictions and substantive limits on shareholder litigation. Indeed, the extent of these limits raises a reasonable question as to whether Macey is fair in characterizing litigation as regulatorily encouraged.
With respect to state court derivative litigation, traditional procedural limits include a limitation on standing (the contemporaneous ownership requirement), a requirement that the plaintiff post, in some states, security for expenses, and most importantly, a requirement that the plaintiff either make a demand that the board of directors initiate the suit or demonstrate why such a demand would be futile." The significance of these procedural limits pales beside the most important 70 This transfer has been described as the "circularity problem." See Jill E. Fisch At the same time, institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, have become increasingly involved in shareholder litigation. Early empirical studies suggest that these institutions have been remarkably effective in reducing the agency costs associated with private litigation.' Cases involving institutional lead plaintiffs are settled for larger amounts and, at the same time, fee awards to plaintiffs' counsel are lower, leaving a greater percentage of the settlement to compensate class members. 3 Indeed, Macey discusses the landmark In re Cendant Corp Litigation" decision, in which three public pension funds jointly supervised litigation that led to a record settlement, and a surprisingly low fee award (p 150). Although Macey is not explicit on this point, the Cendant fee award was only 1.7 percent of the class recovery," far less than the traditional benchmark of 25 to 30 percent.m
Reducing the costs of private litigation increases its capacity to deter corporate misconduct. As a variety of commentators have observed, this deterrent effect, although difficult to quantify, operates as stage, by appropriate expert testimony, that it was the corrective disclosure of the fraud and not unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant amount of the stock price decline). 83 See Cox and Thomas, 106 Colum L Rev at 1599, 1624 (cited in note 82) (noting that institutional lead plaintiffs "often able to lower counsel fees to one-half to one-third of the historical average of 32% of the recovery" and demonstrating statistically that "institutional investor cases exhibit much larger settlements"). But see Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard, 83 Wash U L Q at 900-01 (cited in note 82) (questioning whether the identified correlation is caused by institutional investor monitoring). a powerful corporate governance device.8 Importantly, the deterrent effect of litigation is supplemented by its role in increasing the efficiency (and thereby the discipline) of the capital markets.
In a recent article, I explain that private securities litigation, by compensating investors who engage in reliance-based trading, increases their incentive to uncover, analyze, and rely on corporate disclosures in their trading decisions." This activity performs a key role in enabling the trading markets to incorporate information into securities prices. Macey's model of capital markets discipline depends critically upon informationally efficient markets which, in turn, require investors to engage in firm-specific research and to trade on the basis of that research. Although indexing and other passive investment strategies can reduce an investor's risk of fraud-based losses, such strategies do not promote market efficiency. Private litigation can compensate informed traders who bear disproportionately the costs of research and of fraud because those traders, through their actions, create a positive corporate governance externality.
II. MARKET-BASED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A fundamental premise of Promises Kept is the superiority of capital market discipline to traditional corporate governance mechanisms such as boards, gatekeepers, and external institutions. As Macey explains, private sector market participants have the appropriate economic incentives to address corporate governance in order to increase firm profitability (p 47)." Moreover, these very incentives reduce the susceptibility of market actors to the political pressures that Macey blames for corrupting regulation. Macey reserves his highest praise for the takeover market (p 118).' As he repeatedly explains, takeovers provide a market-based discipline for managers by enabling shareholders to replace managers of underperforming companies. A takeover bidder buys such a company and improves performance by effecting strategic changes, such as replacing management, cutting costs, or making structural changes. Because the company's poor performance will have been reflected in a low stock price, and because efficient strategic changes will cause the stock price to increase, the bidder profits, as do shareholders who remain invested in the company. Selling shareholders benefit as well; as Macey explains, they generally receive a premium of around 50 percent of the pre-bid trading price when they sell their stock in a tender offer (p 119).
Macey's defense of the hostile takeover is consistent with the dominant law and economics view of the 1980s-presented most famously by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel." Scholars such as Easterbrook and Fischel argued that, because of the clear benefits of the takeover market, incumbent management should be precluded from interfering with hostile takeovers. Accordingly, they advocated a policy of management passivity.
Other commentators disagreed, arguing that not all takeovers were efficient." Some takeovers, they argued, were economically irrationalfunded by cheap debt and leading to excessive leverage. These concerns have renewed resonance in today's market. According to takeover critics, some takeovers consist largely of wealth transfers -from one group of shareholders to another," from creditors to shareholders, and from employees to shareholders. Some takeovers take advantage of market 9 Macey states, "The most important market-inspired component of the U.S. corporate governance infrastructure is the market for corporate control" (p 118). conditions to buy out shareholders at a temporary premium reflecting an unfair or bargain price. Shareholder collective action problems, coupled with, in some cases, incomplete disclosure and coercive structures, make it difficult for shareholders to identify these situations and to distinguish them from truly value-enhancing transactions.
To date, the empirical analysis of takeovers has failed to resolve the dispute over their efficiency. Although the literature is too extensive to review in detail here, some empirical studies support Macey's claim that many takeovers are efficient, resulting in improved governance and producing synergistic gains. 5 Others cast doubt on the efficiency hypothesis. A well-known article by Shleifer and Vishny suggests that irrational stock market misvaluation rather than synergies drives most takeovers." Research by Ming Dong, et al, finds that bidders tend to expropriate value from target shareholders, either by "buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder."" Several studies have found that although target shareholders may profit from a takeover, shareholders of the acquiring firm lose money." Empirical studies also suggest that takeovers, at least in some cases, adversely affect consumer welfare. Thus, from an efficiency perspective, the existing empirical evidence is equivocal as to whether takeovers are an effective governance device and the extent to which existing regulatory restrictions are undesirable (p 122).'. In addition, existing restrictions have not eliminated the takeover. Macey reveals a degree of nostalgia for the transactions that characterized the mid-1980s (pp 236-37) . Concededly, the two-tiered offers of that era are largely extinct, but hostile offers are not. Indeed, hostile takeovers hit record levels in 2008 in response to falling stock prices.' 0 ' More generally, although the poison pill and judicial decisions have reshaped the form of takeovers, they have not dissuaded hedge funds, private equity firms, and other bidders from pursuing attractive targets.m' Even with the existing regulatory restrictions, the market for corporate control continues to function as a governance device.
In addition, the takeover market is limited in its applicability as a corporate governance mechanism. Takeovers are costly, and some companies are just too big to buy. The cost of financing requires appropriate credit market conditions. Most importantly, takeovers are only effective if a company's stock price is undervalued. If stock price is too high, whether because of a general market bubble or company-specific fraud, the takeover market does not offer a mechanism for correction. For companies like Enron and WorldCom, for example, takeovers were not an answer (although short selling might have been)."
Macey also defends the IPO market, arguing that the rigorous monitoring by investment banks and other gatekeepers serves a valuable gatekeeping function (p 127).'N In describing IPOs as an effective governance mechanism, Macey appears largely to support the fundamental premise of federal securities regulation: rigorous disclosure requirements -imposed primarily at the time a firm issues securities to the public and enforced through liability for the firm, firm officials, and other gatekeepers -are the most effective method of promoting sound capital markets. At least according to Macey, the "due diligence" process, by which underwriters and other gatekeepers protect investors, results from statutory obligations imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 (p 127)."s In imposing these obligations, Congress determined that market-based incentives, reputational constraints, and norms were insufficient to prevent gatekeepers from engaging in deceptive sales practices, market manipulation, or outright fraud."6 Indeed, in regulating the IPO market, Congress used strict liability (mediated by affirmative defenses), a particularly strong form of regulation.1or
The recent financial meltdown suggests that the regulatory interventions of the public offering process serve a valuable function in curbing market excess. The overwhelming majority of financial instruments that turned out to be excessively risky or outright fraudulent were sold through private placements or were specifically exemptedby Congress or SEC rule-from regulatory oversight." The vast $450 billion global derivatives market, which included the now infamous credit default swaps that led to AIG's collapse, operated completely outside the authority of the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve. Most collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are sold pursuant to an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, such as Rule 144A, which exempts securities sold exclusively to qualified institutional buyers." 0 Absent regulatory supervision, it appears that even the most sophisticated investors, such as the world's largest investment banks, could not protect themselves adequately.
At the same time, it is necessary to be cautious in extolling the virtues of the IPO market. As many scholars have observed, the informational efficiency upon which Macey relies in defending capital market discipline is more limited in the IPO market." Scholars have identified evidence of possible inefficiencies, including underpricing," 2 the so-called "hot issues market,""' and long-term underperformance of IPO stocks."' These inefficiencies suggest irrationality on the part of IPO investors and favoritism rather than gatekeeping by investment bankers."' In addition, the IPO market offers some difficulty for Macey's assessment of takeover defenses. Jonathan Karpoff finds that a majority of IPO firms have antitakeover defenses in place at the time they go public."' The extent to which these defenses are priced-in is unclear, but this evidence suggests either that the market's pricing of takeover defenses in an IPO is inefficient.. or that takeover defenses are not wealth-destroying for shareholders. In his work on the role of lawyers in drafting these provisions, John Coates raises further questions about the effectiveness of gatekeepers in protecting investor interests."
As for hedge funds and other activist investors, Macey is clearly right in identifying their valuable role in finding market inefficiencies and other arbitrage opportunities (p 246). Macey's characterization of hedge funds as focused on corporate governance is, however, something of an overstatement (pp 244-45). To be sure, Carl Icahn, Relational Investors, Crescendo Partners, and several others have impressive track records in identifying undervalued corporations and employing strategies designed to improve their performance. In the parlance adopted for the purposes of this litigation, in making strategic block investments, GTO identifies companies whose shares are selling below what GTO believes the company as a whole could be sold for. GTO buys a large block of the company's stock. It then seeks to influence management to sell the company at a premium. If successful, this strategy would generate a quick and big profit for GTO and its investors. Id at 1271.
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[77:923 small percentage of the industry,"' and corporate governance-type activism is only one of a variety of hedge fund strategies. Even activist hedge funds focus primarily on financial engineering rather than long-term operating strategies.'" While it may make sense to sell off a subsidiary, engage in a stock repurchase, or increase corporate borrowing, these are the strategies of former investment bankers, not long-term "strategic partners" (pp 248-49)'2 and it is unclear whether they truly enhance long-term corporate performance. For example, one of the more common changes advocated by hedge funds is increasing corporate leverage. Leverage has the effect of multiplying shareholder returns so long as the firm's profits exceed its cost of borrowing. It is an effective strategy as long as profits are high and interest rates are low. When the credit markets dried up in the fall of 2008, firms that had relied on credit rather than cash reserves found it difficult to weather the economic crisis. Studying hedge fund activism before the credit crisis, April Klein and Emanuel Zur found negative effects on firm creditworthiness including a reduction in bondholder 122 See Lipton and Savitt, 93 Va L Rev at 746 (cited in note 67) (describing hedge fund activists as "financial engineers"). 123 In analyzing the strategies of activist investors, Macey does not distinguish sharply between hedge funds and private equity (indeed, he argues that the strategies of the two have converged) (p 245). Private equity operates quite differently from hedge funds, however. Increasingly, private equity firms bring in former public company executives, who focus more on operational strate- 124 See Chris Serres, Targeting Target, Star Trib D1 (Jan 13, 2008) (criticizing a hedge fund for advocating the sale of one of Wendy's fastest growing units and observing that, although the sale generated substantial gain for the hedge fund, Wendy's price subsequently fell by almost 50 percent).
returns and a dramatic increase in firm risk." Furthermore, if pressuring issuers to increase leverage is a common hedge fund strategy, it is likely to increase systemic as well as firm-specific risk."' Even hedge fund strategies that do not involve leverage can contribute to systemic risk. Moreover, the secrecy of a particular hedge fund's strategy does not prevent its position from being correlated with those of other hedge funds. In particular, hedge funds control a tremendous amount of money that is often deployed in the form of market-based bets. To the extent that they are able to find willing counterparties, hedge funds dramatically increase the level of speculative market activity. Even if their bets are right, the losses may be devastating for the counterparties. The subprime crisis offers an example. A substantial number of hedge funds bet against the housing market by purchasing credit default swaps. AIG served as the counterparty on these swaps. When the housing market collapsed, not only did AIG suffer huge losses, but the hedge funds made collateral calls that created an immediate liquidity crisis.' This lack of liquidity, in turn, threatened the entire banking system, necessitating immediate government action.1
Moreover, hedge funds historically have been virtually unregulated, although the financial crisis will likely lead to increased regulation in the future. 12 Macey's citation to the Williams Act'" as a regulatory restriction on hedge fund activism is unpersuasive (p 122); for most hedge fund activism, the Williams Act is simply irrelevant. Unless a hedge fund is making a tender offer, the Williams Act does not require it to disclose anything until after it acquires its stock, at which point disclosure does not increase the fund's acquisition costs. Activist hedge funds often welcome this disclosure as providing a vehicle for making 125 April Klein and Emanuel Zur, The Implications of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm's Existing Bondholders *26-27 (working paper, Nov 2008) (on file with author) (finding that within a year of being targeted by a hedge fund, 29 percent of the targets' credit ratings are downgraded).
126 Macey, however, argues that hedge funds pose no systemic risk "because of the incredible diversity in their investment strategies" (p 268). their case public. Hedge funds that do not have an interest in affecting the control of a publicly traded issuer-the vast majority of hedge funds -often need not disclose anything under the Williams Act.
Macey's concern that required disclosure will increase the cost of purchasing control appears at odds with his defense of takeovers as benefitting target shareholders. If a hedge fund purchases control, preacquisition disclosure enables public shareholders to share some of the benefits of the fund's activism by demanding a higher price. If a hedge fund could purchase control without disclosing its intentions, the benefit to target company shareholders would be reduced. This would have the effect of converting the takeover market into a private arbitrage opportunity for bidders rather than a corporate governance mechanism.m Perhaps the most creative part of Promises Kept is the chapter on Quirky Governance (pp 165-98). In this chapter, Macey draws an analogy between whistle-blowing and insider trading as tools for exposing corporate misconduct. He compares the actions and motives of Raymond Dirks, whom the SEC charged with insider trading, with those of Sherron Watkins in the Enron case. Although he does not "vilify" her, Macey portrays Watkins far less favorably than he portrays Dirks (p 172).
Generalizing from this comparison, Macey argues that the motives of insider traders and whistle-blowers are typically quite similar. Insider trading, he explains, is, however, a potentially more effective governance mechanism than standard whistle-blowing, both because it creates a financial incentive to expose wrongdoing and because the employee's financial investment increases the credibility of his or her disclosure (pp 175-76).
Macey goes on to consider the legitimacy of permitting a limited form of insider trading-short selling by innocent employees with knowledge of corporate misconduct. He argues that such selling is technically consistent with at least the property rights view of insider trading because a company does not have a proprietary interest in maintaining the secrecy of its ongoing fraudulent behavior (p 184). Drawing upon sources ranging from John Locke to John Rawls, he also addresses fairness considerations (pp 189-93).
Macey's defense of short selling is one of the most important components of Promises Kept. As Macey notes, short selling has traditionally been denounced by issuers and regulators (p 165).'" The SEC has responded to issuer complaints of short selling by opening investigations and, in some cases, bringing enforcement actions against hedge funds and other investors who sell short.'
33 Recently, Overstock.com sued a research firm that issued negative reports on its stock and a hedge fund that sold its stock short.'3 One of the SEC's first (and only) responses to the market crisis during the summer of 2008 was to introduce repeated bans on short selling, seemingly with the idea that, if investors could not sell short, prices would not fall.' 35 Yet, as Macey explains, short sellers provide a critical role in detecting overpricing and improving capital market efficiency (p 173).'" Their ability to do so currently remains in jeopardy.
Macey's defense of short selling is limited to the whistle-blower context, yet if his goal is to provide financial incentives that will encourage insiders to reveal fraud, insider trading is an imprecise solution. Among other concerns, there is no correlation between the whistle-blower's reward from insider trading and the social value of the disclosure; the whistle-blower's payoff depends only on the amount of money that he or she is willing to invest. A more finely tuned solution would incentivize low-level employees with a bounty tied to the value of their disclosure. This approach would resemble the qui tam system currently in place under the federal False Claims Act.
Macey's proposal also creates a potential moral hazard problem in that insiders might be encouraged to disseminate negative information in order to create trading opportunities. Distinguishing good faith whistle-blowing from vindictiveness is already difficult without the added motive of personal financial gain. If regulators view the potential for manipulation as significant, the risk of sanctions is likely to have a substantial chilling effect on whistle-blower trading. Nonetheless, the basic premise of this proposal -providing financial incentives for corporate insiders to reveal information that increases capital market transparency-is sound. As such, Macey's suggestion warrants further development.
III. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The core premise of Promises Kept is that market discipline is a more effective corporate governance mechanism than gatekeepers or procedural mechanisms mandated by external regulators. Developments subsequent to the publication of Macey's book, specifically the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and its impact on the broader global economy, attest to the accuracy of many of Macey's criticisms.
The dramatic failure of the credit agencies is particularly notable. Before the revelations in the summer of 2008,"' Macey observed that credit rating agencies "provid[e] no information of value" (p 115). Subsequent developments revealed not only that the rating agencies had modeled the risk of structured financial products inappropriately, but they had also, in some cases, designed the very products they were rating in collaboration with the issuers. Moreover, Macey is spot on in attributing the failure of the rating agencies to the regulatory structure within which they operate. As Macey explains, the SEC's Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization" (NRSRO) designation empowers the rating agencies to designate which securities are suitable for a host of regulated investors including banks, money market funds, and pension funds (p 115)." These regulations have the effect of substituting the agency for the market, as well as creating an artificial demand for ratings irrespective of their underlying accuracy."' Recent events also add fuel to Macey's criticisms of the accounting industry. 1 4 2 Macey argues that Sarbanes-Oxley does not adequately address problems of firm capture and the absence of sufficient reputational constraints on accounting firms, reasoning that the cartelization of the industry prevents a market-based response to the demand for quality auditing services (pp 161-63).1' Concededly, audit fees have gone up,'" and auditors have reportedly become more conservative. Yet the accounting industry has substantially contributed to the lack of transparency in the financial statements of large financial institutions through deficiencies and inconsistencies in its standards for reporting off-balance-sheet transactions, derivatives, and toxic assets. [Rating agencies were] transparently understating risk and inflating the grading scale of their debt ratings for securitized products so that institutional investors-who are constrained by various regulations to invest in debts highly rated by NRSROs-would be able to invest as they liked without being bound by the constraints of regulation or the best interests of their clients. 142 The downturn has not uncovered a major accounting scandal to date. As the Financial Times notes, however, "PwC's role as auditor and consultant for Northern Rock has been questioned, as has Ernst & Young's audit of Lehman Brothers." Accountants, Fin Times 14 (Sept 8, 2009) (noting that "litigation tends to lag behind a recession"). 143 The evidence on whether auditor reputation matters is mixed. See Joseph Weber, Mi- at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3959/lawmakers-rap-fasb-on-sub-prime-more (visited Oct 18, 2009) ("Collapsing credit markets have exposed a weakness that remains in accounting rules, even after Enron's collapse first underlined the need for more transparency around off-Anecdotal evidence suggests the industry is unable even to keep its own house in order. On July 31, 2009, Huron Consulting (which was formed by former partners at Arthur Andersen and which specializes in forensic accounting) announced expected material weaknesses in its own internal controls over financial reporting." It disclosed errors that required it to restate three years of financial statements and to reduce its reported income by almost 50 percent.' Clearly neither the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms nor the founders' prior association with Arthur Andersen provided adequate incentives for Huron's partners to invest sufficient effort in maintaining the firm's reputation. As Bloomberg reporter Jonathan Weil put it, "The curse of Andersen ... lives on."" 9 Finally, as I have detailed elsewhere,n developments suggest that Macey is perhaps charitable in characterizing the recent enforcement performance of the SEC as "anemic" politicization (p 110) also appears supported by recent Commission votes on controversial issues that were split along party lines." Yet it would be overly simplistic to attribute the financial crisis to a failure in corporate governance. The crisis revealed substantial weaknesses in capital market discipline as well. In particular, the markets appeared unable to assess and price the riskiness of financial firms, to value derivatives, swaps, and other financial products, and to cope with the potential effect of systematic, as opposed to firmspecific, risk.' An unprecedented number of firms engaged in unsound business practices and took on enormous amounts of risk without the corresponding check of market discipline reducing their stock prices. Indeed, the inflated stock prices enjoyed by these firms enabled their managers to justify collecting huge compensation packages as they drove their companies toward collapse."' Can it truly be said, as Macey claims, that "share prices provide the best lens with which to evaluate corporate performance" (p 155) when Bear Stearns traded for almost $170 per share in January 2007, Lehman's stock price was over $65 per share at the beginning of 2007 before falling by more than 70 percent in the next six months (and subsequently becoming worthless when the company declared bankruptcy), and Enron traded for over $90 per share in August 2000? Effective capital markets discipline requires more than informational efficiency; it requires sufficient firm-specific information to be available to the market and for investors to incorporate that information into their pricing and trading decisions. In particular, three develop- ments threaten the effectiveness of capital market discipline: a decline in transparency, an increase in the percentage of equity held by investor intermediaries, and a decrease in accountability.
With respect to market transparency, Macey accepts and even endorses the role of regulation in mandating disclosure (p 158). Yet existing regulatory gaps reduce the quality and quantity of disclosure. Exemptions from the registration process such as Rule 144A allow issuers to sell both traditional securities and new financial instruments without the gatekeepers and disclosure requirements mandated by the IPO process." The Commodities Futures Modernization Act exempts swaps and most over-the-counter derivatives from regulation by either the SEC or the CFTC" 7 and facilitated the dramatic growth of the virtually unregulated private credit markets as a source of capital before their collapse in the summer of 2008. Similarly, unregulated counterparties, including hedge funds, have enabled issuers to buy, sell, and repackage unprecedented quantities of risk, often with limited disclosure of that risk to the public markets and regulators.
Even publicly traded companies have become less transparent. Enron dramatically demonstrated that if the market is given fraudulent information, share prices cannot provide reliable information about firm value. Apart from the fraudulent aspects of its financial statements, however, Enron showed how accounting rules and structured transactions allow issuers to obfuscate the nature of their operations and the level of risk to which they are exposed. ' Enron is neither an isolated nor outdated example. The recent debate over the appropriate methodology in valuing so-called toxic assets [T]he private credit market is comprised of investors, such as hedge funds, who fall outside of regular review. Regulations or industry initiatives that enhance transparency-in pricing, secondary trading, and ownership-may help address systemic concerns arising from the possibility of accumulations of risk over which neither regulators nor market participants today are aware. Doing so may also enhance the availability of information in the private credit market and the informational content of trading prices. for the purposes of financial disclosure illustrates the continued difficulty-practically and politically-in achieving transparency." After the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changed its requirements on fair value accounting,16 not surprisingly, the major financial institutions reported dramatically improved financial results.' Despite the fact that these changes were purely cosmetic, the market responded to them favorably.'6 Revelations about Lehman's "Repo 105" maneuver raise similar concerns about the lack of transparency.
A second concern is the increase in investor intermediaries. Transparency is not enough; disclosed information must be incorporated into share price through the actions of informed traders. There is reason to believe, however, that the percentage of such trading has declined. A growing amount of US equity is effectively controlled by intermediaries-mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and so forth.' The incentives and objectives of these intermediaries, and their agents who make trading decisions, differ from those of traditional retail investors.' 6 6 Some intermediaries invest passively in accordance with an index, some engage in herding, some seek to maximize their performance relative to a benchmark or a peer group, some seek absolute returns, and some may take advantage of momentum and irrationality to engage in trading strategies that actually drive prices away from true value, as in riding a bubble. 67 recent years, and studies suggest that the SEC has played a very limited role in uncovering corporate fraud."' As Macey observes, one explanation is the extent of political influence over the SEC's activities (p 110). Policymakers have considered moving to a system in which the SEC is self-funded rather than dependent on Congress for budget increases." The recent crisis has renewed consideration of this option, which might provide a start toward greater independence.' I have also argued that SEC appointments should incorporate broader constituency representation and diversity of focus to reduce the agen-174 cy's susceptibility to interest group capture.
One potential check on political influence and agency capture is private litigation, which serves as a backstop for retaining accountability during periods when public enforcement is politically costly. 175 The benefit of private litigation is twofold. First, by increasing the potential cost of fraud, litigation deters potential misconduct. Second, by compensating traders who are misled by fraud, litigation allows uninformed and nontrading investors to share the costs borne by informed traders who produce a governance externality through informationbased trading. The financial crisis offers an opportunity to evaluate whether restrictions on private litigation have gone too far. Congress would do well to consider, for example, whether existing limitations on secondary actor liability, strict pleading requirements, and narrow understandings of causation and reliance are consistent with maintaining adequate capital market discipline.
The foregoing concerns are only a starting point in considering reforms to improve the effectiveness of the capital markets as a corporate governance mechanism. Commentators have identified many other areas of concern: the high levels of leverage in the markets, excessive volatility, black pools of capital, and other methods of rapid and surreptitious trading. The key message of Promises Kept is that reform efforts are best directed to enhancing market discipline rather than imposing external governance mechanisms. Concededly, any regulatory reform bears with it the risk of political influence, industry capture, and simple government error-risks that suggest policymakers should tread carefully. The message of the financial crisis, however, is that fear of these risks should not result in blind complacency about the effectiveness of market-based governance.
CONCLUSION
As policymakers struggle to respond to the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, and to implement reforms designed to increase the stability and productivity of US corporations, understanding corporate governance can help. Promises Kept offers a valuable history and analysis of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, explaining how they work and why they often do not. More important for current reform efforts, Promises Kept identifies critical weaknesses that may thwart even the best intentioned efforts at regulation, such as capture, political pressure, and regulatory arbitrage. Many of these weaknesses have been highlighted in the recent economic turmoil, and Macey's book should serve as a warning to those who might seek solutions in greater board independence or regulatory agency restructurings.
Yet it would be a mistake to attribute the financial crisis to a governance failure. As recent events have demonstrated, the capital markets offer increasingly high-powered incentives for issuers and their agents to structure, trade, and speculate in risk, and new financial products increase the probability that the effects of excessive risktaking will not be isolated within a single firm. The systemwide externalities imposed by firm failure belie the claim that shareholders are protected adequately from risk through proper diversification and call for reforms that increase governance responses to risky behavior, both within the firm and within the market.
Here is where Promises Kept delivers. The appropriate objective of governance regulation is an efficient capital market. Regulatory reforms should focus on enhancing share price accuracy by mandating transparency, providing incentives for informed trading, and increasing accountability for misinformation. Changes to market structure, the development of new financial products, and globalization all serve to test the efficacy of traditional governance mechanisms. Understanding the deficiencies of the current system offers the promise of structuring markets that are better able to meet the challenges of the future.
